| Legislative Council Reform |
The
structure of the Council The
boundaries Financial
powers Lower
House Changes Voting
for the Council Conclusion
The structure of the Council
The Boundaries
Financial Powers
Lower House Changes
Voting for the Council
Conclusion
Currently
At present, the Legislative Council consists of 44 Members,
half of whom retire at each general election. There are 22 provinces, each having
2 Members, elected on the standard preferential system.
The Government's proposal
The Bill before State Parliament at present proposes that the
number of Members be reduced to 35, all retiring at each election. The number
of provinces will be reduced to 5, each having 7 Members elected under proportional
representation.
Comment
When Victoria became a Crown Colony in 1851, the Legislative
Council, the first House of Parliament, was originally partly nominated by the
Governor. For 100 years until the 1950's, voters were required to have educational
or property qualifications. Elections for the Legislative Council were held
separately from those for the Legislative Assembly and the two Houses
largely acted independently. For the past 50 years, it has been elected under
adult franchise in the same way as the Legislative Assembly and the elections
have been held simultaneously.
These changes have worked against the interests of rural areas. This is because
a candidate for an Assembly Electorate has to keep in mind the interests of
a running mate contesting the Legislative Council Province at the same election.
Because the Provinces encompassed four Assembly Electorates, in rural areas
they become very large and include at least one substantial urban area. This
leads to conflicting interests that do not occur in compact metropolitan provinces.
There are times when a candidate can feel constrained in expressing opinions
freely because it may adversely affect his/her running mate. This inhibits the
free expression of views
that should be the hallmark of a democratic institution.
It is quite obvious that a government can curry favour in the provincial cities
as a counter to neglect of their surrounding rural areas. For these reasons,
there appears to be no worthwhile benefit for rural areas to support the current
system.
Recommendation
That the proposal to reform the Legislative Council with 5 Provinces
electing 7 Members each should be supported.
Currently
At present, the Legislative Council has 14 provinces that are entirely metropolitan-based
thus electing 28, or 64%, of the 44 Members. Adjoining Provinces are also strongly
influenced by the metropolis.
The Government's proposal
The Constitution (Reform) Bill proposes that three Provinces
should be within the metropolitan area. Thus, 21, or 60%, of the 35 Members
will represent metropolitan Melbourne to the exclusion of the rest of the State.
Comment
While this appears to be a very marginal improvement on the
present system, it does not meet the fundamental problem confronting rural Victoria,
which is that the government, as distinct from the Parliament, is not representative
of the whole State. Reform of the Legislative Council will
not overcome that difficulty but it provides the opportunity to try out a system
that may lead to rural Victorians feeling that they have some real influence
in Parliament.
There is no valid reason why the Capital city needs to maintain total domination
over the rest of the State. It is unrealistic for governments to claim concern
for the problems confronting country communities and, at the same time, legislate
to deny them any influence on decisions that affect their very existence.
The Electoral Boundaries Commission was established to replace a system under
which the government of the day appointed three Commissioners to draw boundaries
under conditions laid down in an Act of Parliament. At one time, those conditions
provided that the quota for voters in rural electorates should be lower than
in provincial seats, which in turn were lower than for metropolitan seats.
Introducing the Electoral Boundaries Commission Bill, Premier John Cain said,
"The establishment of an independent and impartial Commission will, once
and for all, remove the influence of politicians over electoral boundaries."
He did not, however, accept that the Commission was sufficiently independent
and impartial to decide whether there was justification for a greater variation
than 10% in the quotas for electorates. Indeed, he was emphatic that it should
be no more than 5% but he was prepared to compromise his strongly held view
on this aspect as the Legislative Council had already agreed to it. It was the
growth areas within the metropolitan area that were given the advantage of lower
numbers available within that limitation so that they would remain within the
prescribed quotas for a longer period of time.
The present Bill places a further constraint on the independence and impartiality
of the Commission by requiring it to make three of the five new provinces entirely
metropolitan based.
Recommendation
That the Constitution (Reform) Bill be amended by removing the direction to
provide three provinces to represent Melbourne and adding that the provinces
must be as nearly as practicable equal in area as well as voters.
This will ensure that, even if the Commissioners share the views of the former
Premier on fairness and equity, they will be obliged to ensure that all Legislative
Councillors have comparable obligations to represent the whole spectrum of issues
that affect the State. It rectifies the present position whereby over 60% of
the Legislative Council can ignore, or even worse, push their own narrow
views, on issues that affect non-metropolitan Melbourne. This will require the
Commissioners to be fair, not compel them to be unfair.
It is acknowledged that the effects of this amendment are uncertain but, at
least, they give rural voters the opportunity to elect one of the seven Members
in each Province. They may also have a decisive influence on the election of
other Members. This should lead to a government becoming more attentive to the
views of non-metropolitan residents.
Currently
The Legislative Council cannot amend the Budget put to Parliament
by the Government but it can defeat it. In that event, half the Members of the
Legislative Council have to face the resulting election.
The Government's proposal
The Annual Appropriation Bills are to be considered by the Legislative
Assembly only. Other Appropriation Bills have to be referred to the Legislative
Council, which may reject but not amend them.
Comment
This would give unfettered power to a government for four years
no matter what outrageous action it may take.
Although rural areas reacted against some of the legislation passed by the previous
Parliament, the greater reaction was to the way the Government spent money in
the metropolitan area and neglected the rest of the State. It is essential
to retain the power for the Legislative Council to reject Supply, particularly
if the proposed changes make it more responsive to the views of non-metropolitan
voters.
In former years, the Legislative Councillors were elected for a fixed term.
When the Legislative Council refused Supply, it was the Legislative Assembly
alone that had to face the electorate. In more recent years, the Councillors
serve for two Assembly terms and half of them have to face an election whenever
the Assembly does. It was understandable that there was some resentment that
those who voted to throw the government out did not necessarily have to go to
the election themselves.
Under this proposal, all of the Legislative Councillors will have to face an
election if that House blocked the Annual Appropriation Bills. Under the proposed
proportional representation election system, it is virtually certain that no
government would have control of the Upper House. The Members whose votes would
swing the decision would be those last of the seven in each province elected
at the previous election and therefore the most vulnerable at the consequent
election. That would be adequate protection against misuse of this power.
Recommendation
That the Legislative Council retain the power to reject the
Annual Appropriation Bills. Consideration should be given to empower the Council
to amend the allocation of funds but not to increase the overall Budget expenditure.
This latter power would give the Parliament real power to test the manner of
government spending of public funds. Under the present system, it is a question
of "take it or leave it" - the Treasurer presents a Budget that
determines priorities of government spending, which Parliament cannot amend
or vary. There is no proportional representation applicable in this vital
process.
In order that the boundaries of Legislative Council Provinces
can coincide with those of the Legislative Assembly Electoral Districts, the
Government Bill proposes a reduction in the number of Lower House seats from
88 to 85. This will have the effect of increasing the average enrolment
of Legislative Assembly seats from 31132 to 32232, an increase of 1100.
This will require a complete redrawing of all boundaries, a fact that is of
some concern to the incumbents. While the interest in metropolitan areas will
centre on how the fortunes of the major political parties will be affected,
in the outer electorates, it will be how much larger in area will they become.
This aspect is the one most likely to bring about the demise of the Bill.
The self interest of the incumbent Members of Parliament, the unbridled lust
for power by the major political parties, together with a media that seems obsessed
with the belief that rural people should have no influence on the government
of this State, will combine to throw out a Bill that, with some amendments,
could become a milestone in democratic government.
Currently
Voting for the Legislative Council follows the standard preferential
system, which has been in use for many years. It has the advantage that it is
fairly easy to understand and has been in use for many years.
The Government's proposal
Proportional representation as proposed in the Bill, is a radical
change. It is a difficult system to comprehend. The Bill acknowledges
this by also making provision for "ease of voting", which allows a
vote to be valid if one box is marked against a political party.
Comments
The advocates of proportional representation claim that it is
the fairest way to elect a Parliament. It does seem to present some chance that
rural voters can have an influence on government, but it does have the potential
to be manipulated. This can be done by the method adopted by political parties
in nominating and ranking their candidates. It can also be varied by the manner
in which the votes are distributed.
This is further compounded by the ease of voting" method of marking a ballot
paper. This is virtually "voting by proxy" as it gives the right to exercise
the vote to a political party. The process assumes that each voter consciously
weighs up the policies of each party and qualities of each candidate and concludes
that the political party of his or her choice has arrived at the best decision.
It is far more likely that the vast majority do not weigh up anything and hand
over their responsibilities to the political party of their choice, just as
a shareholder hands over his right to vote by signing a proxy. This method of
choosing of Members of Parliament is an affront to intelligent and thinking
members of the community. Although it is in use in the Senate, to most voters
that House proves the point. It is unrepresentative and unresponsive, and does
little more than give extremist groups a forum. The number of voters who can
name more than one or two of the 12 Senators that represent them is infinitesimal.
This system puts far too much power into the hands of political parties. There
has already been criminal activity associated with the internal workings of
political parties in this country and the conferring of even more power will
exacerbate this problem. Before such legislation could even be contemplated,
political parties should be required to have the same transparency and accountability
as governments and public servants.
Recommendation
The provisions relating to voting should be amended to omit
"ease of voting" and to require that the Robson Rotation method of
printing names on ballot papers be mandatory. This rotates the order in which
candidates names appear on the ballot papers.
The Parliament belittles the importance of its role by introducing a "quick
pick" system of elections. It is inconsistent to demand that a citizen
must vote and then offer much the same option they have in buying a lottery
ticket.
The alternative proposals contained in this document do not
pretend to answer the problems of representation for rural people. It would
be difficult to challenge the view that the crisis in rural Australia is a direct
result of the imposition of "one vote - one value". It is just plain common
sense that large geographic areas have a greater variety of problems than fully
developed and compact metropolitan areas.
It is a basic right for people to have control of the area, in which they live
and work. It is in the interests of the all citizens that this should be recognised.
These proposals may lead to the recognition that, while the Parliament may be
elected by proportional representation, the government is not. The past decade
has shown that country people have lost faith in the system.