Legislative Council Reform
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    The structure of the Council      

    The Boundaries

    Financial Powers
    Lower House Changes
    Voting for the Council

    Conclusion

 


The structure of the Council 


Currently

At present, the Legislative Council consists of 44 Members, half of whom retire at each general election. There are 22 provinces, each having 2 Members, elected on the standard preferential system.

The Government's proposal

The Bill before State Parliament at present proposes that the number of Members be reduced to 35, all retiring at each election. The number of provinces will be reduced to 5, each having 7 Members elected under proportional representation.

Comment

When Victoria became a Crown Colony in 1851, the Legislative Council, the first House of Parliament, was originally partly nominated by the Governor. For 100 years until the 1950's, voters were required to have educational or property qualifications. Elections for the Legislative Council were held separately from those for the Legislative Assembly and the two Houses
largely acted independently. For the past 50 years, it has been elected under adult franchise in the same way as the Legislative Assembly and the elections have been held simultaneously.

These changes have worked against the interests of rural areas. This is because a candidate for an Assembly Electorate has to keep in mind the interests of a running mate contesting the Legislative Council Province at the same election. Because the Provinces encompassed four Assembly Electorates, in rural areas they become very large and include at least one substantial urban area. This leads to conflicting interests that do not occur in compact metropolitan provinces. There are times when a candidate can feel constrained in expressing opinions freely because it may adversely affect his/her running mate. This inhibits the free expression of views
that should be the hallmark of a democratic institution.

It is quite obvious that a government can curry favour in the provincial cities as a counter to neglect of their surrounding rural areas. For these reasons, there appears to be no worthwhile benefit for rural areas to support the current system.

Recommendation

That the proposal to reform the Legislative Council with 5 Provinces
electing 7 Members each should be supported.

 

The boundaries

Currently

At present, the Legislative Council has 14 provinces that are entirely metropolitan-based thus electing 28, or 64%, of the 44 Members. Adjoining Provinces are also strongly influenced by the metropolis. 

The Government's proposal

The Constitution (Reform) Bill proposes that three Provinces should be within the metropolitan area. Thus, 21, or 60%, of the 35 Members will represent metropolitan Melbourne to the exclusion of the rest of the State.

Comment

While this appears to be a very marginal improvement on the present system, it does not meet the fundamental problem confronting rural Victoria, which is that the government, as distinct from the Parliament, is not representative of the whole State. Reform of the Legislative Council will
not overcome that difficulty but it provides the opportunity to try out a system that may lead to rural Victorians feeling that they have some real influence in Parliament.

There is no valid reason why the Capital city needs to maintain total domination over the rest of the State. It is unrealistic for governments to claim concern for the problems confronting country communities and, at the same time, legislate to deny them any influence on decisions that affect their very existence.

The Electoral Boundaries Commission was established to replace a system under which the government of the day appointed three Commissioners to draw boundaries under conditions laid down in an Act of Parliament. At one time, those conditions provided that the quota for voters in rural electorates should be lower than in provincial seats, which in turn were lower than for metropolitan seats. 

Introducing the Electoral Boundaries Commission Bill, Premier John Cain said, "The establishment of an independent and impartial Commission will, once and for all, remove the influence of politicians over electoral boundaries."

He did not, however, accept that the Commission was sufficiently independent and impartial to decide whether there was justification for a greater variation than 10% in the quotas for electorates. Indeed, he was emphatic that it should be no more than 5% but he was prepared to compromise his strongly held view on this aspect as the Legislative Council had already agreed to it. It was the growth areas within the metropolitan area that were given the advantage of lower numbers available within that limitation so that they would remain within the prescribed quotas for a longer period of time.

The present Bill places a further constraint on the independence and  impartiality of the Commission by requiring it to make three of the five new provinces entirely metropolitan based.

Recommendation

That the Constitution (Reform) Bill be amended by removing the direction to provide three provinces to represent Melbourne and adding that the provinces must be as nearly as practicable equal in area as well as voters. 

This will ensure that, even if the Commissioners share the views of the former Premier on fairness and equity, they will be obliged to ensure that all Legislative Councillors have comparable obligations to represent the whole spectrum of issues that affect the State. It rectifies the present position whereby over 60% of the Legislative Council can ignore, or even  worse, push their own narrow views, on issues that affect non-metropolitan Melbourne. This will require the Commissioners to be fair, not compel them to be unfair.

It is acknowledged that the effects of this amendment are uncertain but, at least, they give rural voters the opportunity to elect one of the seven Members in each Province. They may also have a decisive influence on the election of other Members. This should lead to a government becoming more attentive to the views of non-metropolitan residents.


Financial powers

Currently

The Legislative Council cannot amend the Budget put to Parliament by the Government but it can defeat it. In that event, half the Members of the Legislative Council have to face the resulting election.

The Government's proposal

The Annual Appropriation Bills are to be considered by the Legislative Assembly only. Other Appropriation Bills have to be referred to the Legislative Council, which may reject but not amend them.

Comment

This would give unfettered power to a government for four years no matter what outrageous action it may take.

Although rural areas reacted against some of the legislation passed by the previous Parliament, the greater reaction was to the way the Government spent money in the metropolitan area and neglected the rest of the State.  It is essential to retain the power for the Legislative Council to reject Supply, particularly if the proposed changes make it more responsive to the views of non-metropolitan voters.

In former years, the Legislative Councillors were elected for a fixed term.  When the Legislative Council refused Supply, it was the Legislative Assembly alone that had to face the electorate. In more recent years, the Councillors serve for two Assembly terms and half of them have to face an election whenever the Assembly does. It was understandable that there was some resentment that those who voted to throw the government out did not necessarily have to go to the election themselves.

Under this proposal, all of the Legislative Councillors will have to face an election if that House blocked the Annual Appropriation Bills. Under the proposed proportional representation election system, it is virtually certain that no government would have control of the Upper House. The Members whose votes would swing the decision would be those last of the seven in each province elected at the previous election and therefore the most vulnerable at the consequent election. That would be adequate protection against misuse of this power.


Recommendation

That the Legislative Council retain the power to reject the Annual Appropriation Bills. Consideration should be given to empower the Council to amend the allocation of funds but not to increase the overall Budget expenditure.

This latter power would give the Parliament real power to test the manner of government spending of public funds. Under the present system, it is a question of "take it or leave it"  - the Treasurer presents a Budget that determines priorities of government spending, which Parliament cannot amend or vary. There is no proportional representation applicable in this vital
process.

 

Lower House Changes

In order that the boundaries of Legislative Council Provinces can coincide with those of the Legislative Assembly Electoral Districts, the Government Bill proposes a reduction in the number of Lower House seats from 88 to 85.  This will have the effect of increasing the average enrolment of Legislative Assembly seats from 31132 to 32232, an increase of 1100.

This will require a complete redrawing of all boundaries, a fact that is of some concern to the incumbents. While the interest in metropolitan areas will centre on how the fortunes of the major political parties will be affected, in the outer electorates, it will be how much larger in area will they become. 

This aspect is the one most likely to bring about the demise of the Bill.  The self interest of the incumbent Members of Parliament, the unbridled lust for power by the major political parties, together with a media that seems obsessed with the belief that rural people should have no influence on the government of this State, will combine to throw out a Bill that, with some amendments, could become a milestone in democratic government.

Voting for the Council

Currently

Voting for the Legislative Council follows the standard preferential system, which has been in use for many years. It has the advantage that it is fairly easy to understand and has been in use for many years.

The Government's proposal

Proportional representation as proposed in the Bill, is a radical change.  It is a difficult system to comprehend. The Bill acknowledges this by also making provision for "ease of voting", which allows a vote to be valid if one box is marked against a political party.

Comments

The advocates of proportional representation claim that it is the fairest way to elect a Parliament. It does seem to present some chance that rural voters can have an influence on government, but it does have the potential to be manipulated. This can be done by the method adopted by political parties in nominating and ranking their candidates. It can also be varied by the manner in which the votes are distributed.

This is further compounded by the ease of voting" method of marking a ballot paper. This is virtually "voting by proxy" as it gives the right to exercise the vote to a political party. The process assumes that each voter consciously weighs up the policies of each party and qualities of each candidate and concludes that the political party of his or her choice has arrived at the best decision. It is far more likely that the vast majority do not weigh up anything and hand over their responsibilities to the political party of their choice, just as a shareholder hands over his right to vote by signing a proxy. This method of choosing of Members of Parliament is an affront to intelligent and thinking members of the community. Although it is in use in the Senate, to most voters that House proves the point. It is unrepresentative and unresponsive, and does little more than give extremist groups a forum. The number of voters who can name more than one or two of the 12 Senators that represent them is infinitesimal.

This system puts far too much power into the hands of political parties. There has already been criminal activity associated with the internal workings of political parties in this country and the conferring of even more power will exacerbate this problem. Before such legislation could even be contemplated, political parties should be required to have the same transparency and accountability as governments and public servants.


Recommendation

The provisions relating to voting should be amended to omit "ease of voting" and to require that the Robson Rotation method of printing names on ballot papers be mandatory. This rotates the order in which candidates names appear on the ballot papers.

The Parliament belittles the importance of its role by introducing a "quick pick" system of elections. It is inconsistent to demand that a citizen must vote and then offer much the same option they have in buying a lottery ticket.


Conclusion

The alternative proposals contained in this document do not pretend to answer the problems of representation for rural people. It would be difficult to challenge the view that the crisis in rural Australia is a direct result of the imposition of "one vote - one value". It is just plain common sense that large geographic areas have a greater variety of problems than fully developed and compact metropolitan areas. 

It is a basic right for people to have control of the area, in which they live and work. It is in the interests of the all citizens that this should be recognised.

These proposals may lead to the recognition that, while the Parliament may be elected by proportional representation, the government is not. The past decade has shown that country people have lost faith in the system.